I. Introduction
A number of recent studies confirm that statelessness is a widespread phenomenon in the EU, which is not receiving adequate attention. 1 The lack of well-functioning statelessness determination procedures is at the root of many problems associated with statelessness in the EU. These are, in particular, the inadequate protection of stateless persons and deficiencies in the prevention and reduction of statelessness.
This paper argues in favour of common EU action on the identification and protection of stateless persons by analyzing the EU competence to pass relevant legislation, and explaining the desirability for such legislation.
The UNHCR has emphasized the importance of statelessness determination procedures in recent years. 2 Many EU Member States are taking steps to improve the identification mechanisms for stateless persons. Considering the EU's potential in steering its Member States' laws and policies, it is interesting to explore the possible role of the EU in this process.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Part II provides background information on the problem of statelessness from the point of view of international law, and highlights the place of statelessness in the EU laws and policies nowadays.
Part III focuses on EU competence to pass legislation on the protection and identification of stateless persons. It demonstrates that the identification and protection of stateless persons falls well within the EU's established powers in the field of migration, and that Member States' sovereignty over nationality matters forms no obstacle for exercising these powers. Part IV discusses the desirability of regulating statelessness determination and setting minimum standards for the protection of stateless persons at the EU level. Among others, it argues that relevant 
EU legislation is necessary for the optimal implementation of two UN Statelessness
Conventions in the EU, and for achieving coherence with the EU's foreign policy ambitions in this field.
An important issue which this paper does not address is the political feasibility of setting common standards of access to yet another form of protection status in the EU. The Stockholm Programme which set the EU agenda on migration for years 2010-2014 for was ambitious and challenging, and perhaps has exhausted the policy makers in Brussels. Also, the growing popularity of right-wing anti-immigration political parties does not create an optimal climate for introducing new measures on protection of vulnerable groups of non-nationals. The political will is decisive in whether statelessness will be addressed on the EU level. This paper illustrates that there is a need for an EU-wide action and that the EU has relevant competence and experience to undertake such action. It is up to the world of politics to work with the available legal tools and arguments to promote change for the better.
II. Background

A. Statelessness in international law
Definition and its implementation in practice
The UN defines a stateless person as a person 'who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law'. 3 It is a negatively formulated definition, where statelessness is described in terms of absence of the legal status of nationality.
Such a definition requires further elaboration in order to be implementable in practice. Proving that one is not a national of any state in the world is virtually impossible. Therefore, when applying the definition of a stateless person to a particular individual, the concept of 'any State' needs to be narrowed down. 4 Issues may also arise as to whether a specific political entity is to be considered as a 'State' 
Causes of statelessness
The causes of statelessness are varied. On the technical level statelessness always results from a loss or a non-acquisition of nationality, but the root causes of this problem can be traced to a variety of factors and circumstances. These may include structural discrimination of a minority group, 7 inequality between men and women in their rights to acquire a nationality and pass it on to their children 8 and deficient birth registration mechanisms. 9 Statelessness often occurs in the context of state succession, when some of the nationals of the predecessor state fail to acquire a nationality of any of the successor states. 10 Sometimes statelessness is caused by the so-called 'conflict of laws' -an unfortunate combination of nationality laws from different states that apply to the same person, often in the context of migration and international families. 11 This is not an exhaustive list of causes of statelessness, 12 and often a specific case can be explained by more than one factor.
Consequences of statelessness
A stateless person is usually faced with a number of legal and practical problems, which may include the inability to prove his or her identity, to travel, to register marriage or partnership, to access healthcare, employment, or housing, and so on. 13 Statelessness does not have to result in a humanitarian problem, or grave violations of basic human rights. If adequate identification and protection mechanisms are in place in a specific state, stateless persons residing there can have access to basic rights, or even enjoy all the benefits available to nationals. 14 However, such mechanisms are often missing, as very few national legal systems worldwide have procedures in place to even identify stateless persons on their territories.
Addressing statelessness: identification, protection, prevention, and reduction
The UNHCR suggests tackling statelessness by setting four goals: the identification and protection of stateless persons, and the prevention and reduction of statelessness. 15 The last three goals, namely the protection of stateless persons, and the prevention and reduction of statelessness, have been recognised in international law for many years, and even feature in treaties from before the UN era. 16 (hereafter, the Guidelines). 17 It needs to be pointed out that neither of the two UN Statelessness Conventions places an explicit obligation on contracting states to establish a statelessness determination procedure. The Guidelines maintain, however, that this obligation is implied in the Conventions. 18 A parallel can be drawn with the UN Refugee Convention, 19 which also does not contain an explicit obligation to establish a refugee determination procedure, but with regard to which the implicit obligation to do so has been recognised for decades already. 20 The reasoning in both cases is that it is impossible to comply with the Conventions if the beneficiaries of the rights guaranteed in them are not identified. 
B. Statelessness in the EU: Status Quo
The European Union refers to stateless persons in its laws, but its involvement in addressing the problem of statelessness has so far been very limited. States was published, pointing out a number of areas related to the protection of stateless persons which could benefit from EU harmonization. 27 These included the identification mechanisms, conditions for permitting lawful stay, mutual recognition of travel and identity documents and outcomes of the decisions on status determination, readmission to countries of previous residence, and treatment of stateless persons in Member States other than the one who granted the lawful residence. There has been, however, no follow-up on these recommendations on the EU level, and the UNHCR also seems to have stopped pursuing the issue. More recent academic publications advocate for soft-law EU measures on statelessness, assuming that there is no EU competence to pass relevant legislation. 28 Statelessness is also a topic on the foreign policy agenda of the EU. Specifically, the EU pledged to the UN to develop a framework for raising the issue of statelessness with third countries by 2014. 29 What exactly such a framework would entail remains to be seen, but so far the EU has mainly been criticized for not doing enough to address statelessness abroad. 30 The expectation exists that with more consistent and 26 G. Gyulai clear external policies on statelessness the EU could contribute to solving problems related to statelessness outside its borders.
III. EU competence to identify and protect stateless persons through legislation
The existing literature on statelessness in EU law assumes the lack of EU competence to pass legally binding legislation on statelessness, and therefore concludes that the potential for EU involvement with statelessness is limited to soft-law measures. 31 This assumption is, however, not entirely correct. It is true that Member States still retain nearly complete sovereignty on granting and withdrawing nationality, 32 and therefore the harmonization of EU rules on the reduction and prevention of statelessness through nationality laws would not be acceptable under the current treaty regime. However, the range of problems associated with statelessness goes far beyond the domain of nationality law. In particular, the protection and identification of stateless persons mainly needs to be addressed through the field of migration law.
The EU has well established competence in the field of migration, and can develop mechanisms for the identification and protection of stateless persons.
A. Protection and identification of stateless persons as a migration issue
The identification and protection of stateless persons are the most pressing statelessness related objectives in the EU nowadays. This is evidenced, among others, by the recent UNHCR country case studies on statelessness in the EU, where most recommendations concern the identification and the protection of stateless persons, and only few address the issues of prevention and reduction of statelessness. 33 
Protection
The protection of stateless persons needs to be achieved predominantly through the domain of migration law. 37 That is not to say that all stateless persons are necessarily migrants. Some are stateless in the country they were born in, and never crossed any state borders. 38 The report raises a number of concerns regarding the prevention and reduction of statelessness in Europe, but illustrates that the core legal mechanisms for achieving these goals are usually in place. 36 Note 33 above. 37 Some aspects of protection of stateless persons may be regulated outside of the sphere of migration law. One can argue that the ultimate form of protection that a state can offer to stateless persons is granting them the nationality of that state, which is done through nationality laws. Even though many EU Member States at least in theory facilitate access to nationality for stateless persons, the road to naturalization often takes years, and nearly always requires obtaining a legal residence permit first. 38 The most obvious way to provide protection to stateless persons is to grant them a residence permit. Persons enjoying legal residence in the EU have at least in theory access to a wide package of rights. However, protection does not always need to take the form of providing a residence permit. Stateless persons on a territory of a state may not be interested in establishing residence in that state -they may aspire to settle abroad, but be unable to organize it without state assistance. Moreover, there is no international obligation to offer every stateless person on the state's territory a right to legal residence. Common European Asylum System, where the establishment of the minimum standards for asylum status determination played a central role.
Treaty basis
Careful consideration needs to be given to the selection of a specific Treaty basis for EU legislation on the identification and protection of stateless persons. Article 78 TFEU regulates the procedure for adopting legislation in the field of Common EU Asylum Policy, and Article 79 TFEU empowers the EU to legislate on other forms of immigration to the EU. Statelessness is a peculiar ground for a residence permit in this context. On the one hand, the aim of such a permit would be to provide protection for an individual who is vulnerable due to the lack of a nationality bond with any state. On the other hand, stateless persons do not require same type of protection as asylum seekers, as no typical asylum concerns regarding persecution and non-refoulement are at stake. Except of course if a stateless person also happens to be an asylum seeker, in which case the asylum considerations would form the basis for protection. 40 Some EU Member States group statelessness together with asylum-related procedures, while others approach it as a non-asylum issue. In France, for example, stateless persons and asylum seekers are assisted by the same state authority, the French Office for Protection of Refugees and Stateless persons. 41 In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the residence status originally intended for stateless persons (buiten schuld vergunning) is grouped together with non-asylum residence statuses. 42 The wording of both TFEU articles provides sufficient flexibility to serve as a basis for EU legislation on the identification and protection of stateless persons.
Molnar suggests considering yet another legal basis for EU legislation on statelessness, namely Article 67(2) in conjunction with Article 352 TFEU. 43 The disappearance of the declaration from the Treaty texts has largely gone unnoticed, and the declaration is still occasionally referred to in post-Lisbon documentation. 50 However, the exclusion of the Declaration from the TFEU was not a coincidence, and needs to be seen as part of the continuing search for balance between the EU's and Member States' competences in nationality matters. Even though based on the Treaty texts the EU does not have explicit competence to regulate the acquisition and loss of nationalities of Member States, the influence of EU law on nationality matters is inevitable and frequent. At the current state of development of EU law it is apparent that the EU has a strong impact on Member States' nationality laws and policies through, for example, the formation of the rights of EU citizens, the legislation on asylum and immigration, and the case law of the ECJ.
The legislation on the rights of European citizens and on asylum and immigration has an impact on the regulation of access to nationality in Member States. For example, the requirement of legal residence for a certain number of years is usually central to accessing nationality through naturalization. Individuals who derive their right to reside legally in a Member State through EU legislation may qualify for naturalization because of such legislation. 51 The case of Zhu and Chen 52 and the amendment of the Irish nationality law 53 which followed this judgment present an interesting example of how the EU free movement rights affected a Member State's policy on the acquisition of nationality by birth iure soli.
In addition, an established line of case law of ECJ requires the Member States to have 'due regard' to EU law when regulating access to their nationalities. 54 The exact meaning of what this broad concept of the 'due regard' entails is being gradually defined by the ECJ in its case law on EU citizenship. The Rottmann judgment 55 specified that particularly when statelessness is at stake, the ECJ is prepared to hold Member States' nationality practices to high international standards. In conclusion, even though the EU does not have explicit competence to pass legislation on the acquisition and loss of nationalities of Member States, the latter's sovereignty on nationality matters is not absolute within the EU, and is routinely influenced by other EU laws and policies. Such influences do not contradict the primary legislation on which the EU is based, and have been repeatedly condoned by the ECJ. Therefore, the fact that common EU standards on the identification and protection of stateless persons may have an impact on access to Member States nationalities is by no means an obstacle for the development of such standards.
C. Subsidiarity
Even if the EU has the competence to legislate on the identification and protection of stateless persons, the principle of subsidiarity requires establishing that the EU level is the most appropriate one to pass such measures, as opposed to the national or local levels. 57 The section below discusses a number of reasons why the objectives related to the protection and identification of statelessness can best be achieved at the EU level. In particular, only a coordinated effort by the EU will avoid the 'race to the bottom' phenomenon, and moreover an EU standard is necessary for the consistent interpretation of already existing legislation that addresses stateless persons. 
IV. Justification for EU legislation on identification and protection of stateless persons
As mentioned in the introduction, statelessness is a widespread phenomenon in the European Union, which is not handled adequately, despite the high ratification rate of the two UN Statelessness Conventions. Only very few of the EU Member States have statelessness determination procedures in place within their national systems, 58 and this has been recognized as the most urgent action point as far as statelessness is concerned. 59 Thus, EU Member States need to improve their statelessness identification mechanisms in order to comply with their international treaty obligations in this field.
However, the question remains whether the EU should get involved in this process.
Three criteria for assessing the desirability of EU legislation on statelessness are Secondly, the EU legislation on the identification and protection of stateless persons would lead to an overall better implementation of the international norms on statelessness in the EU. EU legislation has generally a stronger legal position in the national jurisdictions than international treaty norms. Better remedies against noncompliance would be available to stateless persons whose rights are violated.
Enforcing the international standards for identification and protection of stateless persons at the EU level has therefore a potential to give those standards a higher practical value.
B. EU foreign policy agenda
Two years ago the EU has pledged to the UN to 'develop a framework for raising issues of statelessness with third countries by 2014'. 64 In the past, the EU has already touched upon issues of statelessness in its relations with third states and candidate Member States, in particular in the context of pre-accession negotiations. 65 High hopes are often placed on the EU to stand up for the human rights of stateless persons, and to advocate for their right to a nationality all over the world, which lead to criticism of the so far limited EU external action on statelessness. 66 The pledge to the UN indicates an ambition of the EU to become more involved with statelessnessrelated problems abroad. However, if the EU does not take measures on statelessness within its borders, its negotiating power when urging non-Member States to do that is reduced. The framework which they pledge to develop for addressing statelessness abroad cannot be equally effective without a corresponding domestic action. Developing and implementing internal minimum standards on the protection and identification of stateless persons is a prerequisite for exporting these standards abroad, and a necessary first step toward fulfilling the pledge made to the UN.
C. Stateless persons in existing EU legislation
The existence of the status of a stateless person is already acknowledged in the laws within the Common European Asylum System. 67 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union was the first EU treaty to mention stateless persons. 68 
V. Conclusion
Statelessness is prevalent in the EU, as evidenced by the recent UNHCR studies and academic publications. 69 The development of EU-wide standards on the identification and protection of stateless persons would enhance the current national and international efforts in addressing the contemporary challenges of this problem in Europe. Relevant EU legislation would support the existing positive tendencies in the protection of stateless persons in many Member States, and prevent the 'race to the bottom' pressure that could hinder these developments. Moreover, stateless persons fall within the personal scope of some of the existing EU laws, and a common standard of determining who is stateless would increase the coherence of the implementation of these laws. Last but not least, the EU urges non-Member
States to address statelessness in its foreign policy documents. At the same time, the prevalence of this problem within its own borders does not serve as a good example to the outside world, and undermines the EU's legitimacy to set standards externally while no such standards exist internally.
There are numerous reasons why the EU should get involved in the protection and identification of stateless persons in its territory. The relative lack of attention to this issue so far cannot be explained by the lack of legal tools to pass legislation on the identification and protection of stateless persons. Contrary to the common assumption, the EU does have competence to legislate on certain aspects of statelessness, in particular on the identification and protection of stateless persons.
Such competence is based on the EU's mandate in migration affairs. The EU's experience with asylum status determination and the norms on the protection of asylum seekers can be a helpful source of inspiration for structuring equivalent legislation on statelessness.
The EU involvement would be timely at this stage, since most Member States do not have well-functioning statelessness determination procedures yet, and some have 69 See various UNHCR research projects on statelessness in Europe, in particular 'Mapping Statelessness' projects on the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium, available here: <www.refworld.org/statelessness.html>. See also C. Sawyer and B. K. Blitz 'Statelessness in the European Union' (Cambridge University Press, March 2011).
